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11 Introduction
The question of how eﬃciently ﬁscal policy can be used for the stabilisation
of an economy has become a question of great importance for the European
Monetary Union. There is a growing body of literature to answer the call for
a theoretical framework; see Benigno and Woodford (2003), Dixit and Lam-
bertini (2003), Lambertini and Rovelli (2003), Beetsma and Jensen (2002,
2003) amongst others. Some authors study the question in a simpliﬁed,
non-strategic setup, or with complete cooperation between policymakers;
however it is clear that non-cooperative, leadership equilibria can be very
diﬀerent and more realistic. Such a regime is examined by Dixit and Lam-
bertini (2003) using a static model.
A weakness of the static approach is that the stabilisation problem is
intrinsically dynamic, as the role of ﬁscal policy at least partly depends
on debt accumulation. The treatment of dynamic leadership equilibria in
the rational expectations literature has not always been either consistent
or satisfactory. For example, most of the voluminous literature on policy
coordination only considers Nash games. Much of the early analysis relied on
static albeit repeated games (e.g. Canzoneri and Henderson, 1996). In this
work the focus is on an equilibrium bias, where the average level of inﬂation
is permanently above the optimum. In dynamic games, the level bias is less
of an issue: we should rather be worried about so-called stabilisation bias
where it takes longer to reach the long run (or target) equilibrium. This is
manifested in increased unconditional variances of target variables such as
inﬂation or growth. However, any moderately complicated dynamic model
needs to be solved using numerical methods and these methods are neither
readily available nor well articulated for models with rational expectations.1
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we wish to
discuss the results of recent research on monetary and ﬁscal interactions
and leadership, in particular of Dixit and Lambertini (2003), in a dynamic
setting. We show that the form of the game and the leadership assumed
matters considerably: not all Dixit and Lambertini’s results are transferrable
to the analogous dynamic game. We discuss diﬀerent leaderships regimes
and the consequent stabilisation beneﬁts of ﬁscal policy in a single economy.
The ﬁr s tp a r ti si m p o s s i b l et of u l ﬁll without a development of an appro-
priate modelling framework. Therefore, we discuss in details the concepts
of (and solution algorithms for) a leadership discretionary equilibrium for
dynamic linear rational expectations macroeconomic models where we make
the role of leadership in this context explicit. This is best done if one solves
the problem by using Lagrange multipliers. This method conveys the under-
lying information structure and allows the interpretation of the discretionary
1de Zeeuw and van der Ploeg (1991) provides an excellent discussion of discrete dynmaic
g a m e sa n dc a nb ec o m p a r e dw i t ho u ra n a l y s i s .
1optima as feedback Stackelberg equilibria. This method, however, allows to
solve problems which are not indeterminate, i.e. where there is a unique
solution. Clearly, the initial approximation should deliver determinacy too.
It is often not the case in the current mainstream macromodels, at least for
initial conditions. Therefore, we then discuss how to ﬁn dt h es a m es o l u t i o n
with easy-to-use numerical procedures based on the principle of dynamic
programming, which can pickup a solution for indeterminate problem, but
has some other drawbacks instead. Although this framework is a contribu-
tion to the literature and a necessary preliminary step before we investigate
any real problem, we put detailed discussion of the concept and solutions
into Appendix.
In all that follows we are unashamedly game-theoretic in our approach,
and adopt the terminology of dynamic game theory, exempliﬁed in Basar
and Olsder (1999), even when the game is in some sense implied rather
than explicit. This is somewhat at odds with much of the recent monetary
policy literature which constructs consistent equilibria with little regard to
the underlying strategic behaviour. However, we feel that correct treatment
of any potential interactions is vital to the understanding of the resulting
policy regimes.
2 Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction
In order to investigate monetary and ﬁscal policy interactions we use the
Dixit and Lambertini (2003) model modiﬁed to a dynamic context. We
aim to compare diﬀerent leadership equilibria. We also comment on how
eﬀective ﬁscal policy is in stabilising a single economy.
As it is discussed in Appendix A.6, unilateral commitment of one of au-
thorities is not possible in a dynamic game, so we only consider discretionary
game.
We consider a closed economy with two policymakers, the ﬁscal and
monetary authorities. Fiscal policy is allowed to support monetary policy
in stabilisation of the economy. As it is common in the recent literature, we
abstract from the problem of ﬁscal solvency, and consider short-run stabili-
sation only2.
It has been shown in the literature (Kollmann (2003), Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2003) and others) that in a single economy a stabilising ﬁscal
policy can do very little — the consumption gain from stabilisation eﬀorts
does not exceed 0.02% of a steady state consumption level. In a Monetary
Union, however Kirsanova et al. (2003) conclude that a stabilising ﬁscal
2It was shown in Kirsanova, Satchi and Vines (2004) that it is enough for the ﬁscal
a u t h o r i t i e st of e e db a c ko nd e b tw i t has m a l lc o e ﬃcients in order to deliver sustainability
of the debt. All quantitative results are then almost identical for a model with debt and
without it.
2policy greatly improves welfare when economy faces asymmetric shocks, es-
pecially if there is substantial persistence. Therefore we keep a potentially
important property of inﬂation persistence in order to both have truly dy-
namic model3, and investigate welfare improvements from ﬁscal stabilisation
in a single country with persistence. Despite small stabilisation eﬀect, the
leadership issues can be still worth studying — they might be important for
a policy design in a monetary union where the ﬁscal policy is more welfare
improving.
3T h e M o d e l
We consider the now-mainstream macro model, discussed in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997), and slightly modiﬁed to give account to the eﬀects of
ﬁscal policy, in a spirit of Beetsma and Jensen (2002). Here, we only brieﬂy
discuss the main assumptions of the model and the reader is referred to the
Additional Appendix for a derivation of all equations4.
Our economy is inhabited by a large number of individuals, and there
are two policymakers: monetary and ﬁscal authorities. Each representative
individual is a yeoman-farmer, who specialises in the production of one dif-
ferentiated good, denoted by z, and spends h(z) of eﬀort on its production.
An individual also consumes a consumption basket C,a n dξ are technol-







βs−t[u(Cs,ξ s)+f(Gs,ξ s) − v(hs(z),ξ s)] (1)
An individual chooses optimal consumption and work eﬀort to maximise
the criterion (1) subject to the demand system and the intertemporal bud-
get constraint. We have assumed that utility is separable in private and
government consumption.
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to consumption, leads to the fa-
miliar Euler equation (intertemporal IS curve), where ct denotes consump-
tion and all variables are log-deviations from the eﬃcient equilibrium:
ct = ct+1 − σ(it − πt+1)+ηt. (2)
In order to describe price setting decisions we follow Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997) as extended by Steinsson (2003) to get:
πt =( 1− χ)βπt+1 + χπt−1 + κcct + κx0xt + κx1xt−1 + εt (3)
3Despite ignoring the dynamic debt accumulation equation, our model is highly dy-
namic: an appropreate treatment of household behaviour leads to the dynamic consump-
tion process and inﬂation process, which we considet to be highly persistent.
4Available from www.ex.ac.uk/~tkirsano/AppLeadership.pdf
3where π denotes inﬂation and x denotes output. All coeﬃcients can be
derived from microfoundations and given in Appendix B.
The system (2) and (3) is formally equivalent to the optimising behaviour
of a representative agent who maximises (1) subject to an aggregate ‘law
of motion’ of the economy (the demand system, the intertemporal budget
constraint and pricing decisions) when policymaker’s behaviour is taken to
be an exogenous process, independent of the individual’s actions.
Apart from the private sector’s behaviour, explained with (2) and (3),
the evolution of the economy, as observed by the policymakers, includes the
aggregate demand equation (4):
xt = θct +( 1− θ)gt. (4)
Both policymakers are trying to minimise their loss functions. If they are
benevolent, each of them tries to minimise social loss. The one-period social
loss function can be derived as second-order approximation to consumer’s
utility, written in terms, which can be aﬀected by policies. We follow the
approach discussed in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) to derive it, see the
Additional Appendix. We assume that monopolistic distortions are oﬀset
with subsidy, which is ﬁnanced by a lump-sum taxation, so the social loss







The last three terms in the loss function (µ− terms) are due to inﬂation
persistence, while the ﬁr s tf o u rt e r m sa r em o r ec o n v e n t i o n a la n dr e ﬂect
static functional form of household utility. Since our utility is separable in
the private and public consumption, we cannot collapse the three terms with
λ− coeﬃcients into a single quadratic term in output.
If both authorities are benevolent, then the same social loss function
should be given to both of them, it implies that the costs of volatility of the
ﬁscal adjustment are important for the monetary authorities too.
The monetary authorities (MA) use the short-term interest rate to min-








The ﬁscal authorities (FA) are given the same objective but use government
spendings as an instrument.
Although we start with identical loss functions, we aim to investigate
some implications of diﬀerent objectives too. The two policymakers solve
their optimisation problems each period, given initial conditions and time
preferences. The resulting optimal policy reactions lead to stochastic equilib-
ria that should be compared across a suitable metric, independent of initial
4conditions. The obvious choice of this metric is the microfounded social loss,
which on the convenient assumption that social planner does not discount
the future, is a sum of unconditional variances with microfounded weights:
W = λcvar(c)+λgvar(g)+( λx + µx)var(x)+var(π) (7)
+ µπvar(∆π)+µπxcov(x−1,∆π).
Despite that monetary and ﬁscal authorities both aﬀect demand, they
aﬀe c ti ti nav e r yn o n - s y m m e t r i cw a y .T h eﬁscal authorities can change it
directly by means of government purchases, while the monetary authorities
can change intertemporal allocation of consumption and aﬀect the demand
via consumption. Consumption constitutes the biggest part of the aggregate
demand, and we intentionally chose a substantial equilibrium ratio of the
public consumption to output, in order to increase the power of the ﬁscal
policy.
4 A Strategic Discretionary Game
Our problem can be formalised as follows. We have three players in the
game: two explicit players, monetary and ﬁscal authorities, whose objective


















and one implicit player, the private sector, whose optimisation problem is
solved out and can be presented by a diﬀerence equation
Xs+1 = a21Ys + a22Xs + b21UL
s + b22UF
s . (9)
Here U denotes policy instruments of the authorities (either leader L or
follower F — interest rate and government expenditures) and X denotes
instruments of the private sector, inﬂation (inﬂation expectations) and con-
sumption, which are non-predetermined, or jump, variables. Additionally,
the can be predetermined state variables, Y, which evolution can be ex-
plained as
Ys+1 = a11Ys + a12Xs + b11UL
s + b12UF
s (10)
The example of such variable is output as explained by equation (4).
The monetary and ﬁscal authorities can either move ﬁr s t( l e a d e r )o r
second (follower), but the private sector is an ultimate follower in the policy
game: it moves third and treats policy instruments parametrically.
We discuss in the Appendix the information structure of the game and
demonstrate that in a dynamic setup with two policymakers we are lim-
ited to considering discretionary equilibria only: commitment of one of the
5authorities is impossible unless the other authority precommit to the same
target. We discuss two numerical algorithms for a solution of a discretionary
problem in the Appendix, and here we only emphasize that the optimal so-
lution for the monetary and ﬁscal instruments can be written in the form:
UL
s = −FLYs, (11)
UF
s = −FFYs − LUL
s . (12)
Here F denotes feedback coeﬃcients on the predetermined state and L is
the leadership parameter. The leader feeds back on the predetermined state
variables and the follower takes into account the leader’s actions. Thus, the
leader can manipulate the follower by changing its instrument.
5 Discretionary Leadership Equilibria
To compute equilibria, we use numerical algorithm described in Appendix.
We run the following four scenarios, most commonly discussed in the liter-
ature.
In the ﬁrst scenario both authorities are benevolent and use the social loss
function (5) to stabilise the economy. They still act non-cooperatively under
either monetary or ﬁscal leadership. We use this scenario as a benchmark
for further investigations.
In the second scenario we, following Dixit and Lambertini (2003), we
investigate the case where the monetary authorities are more conservative
than ﬁscal authorities. The ﬁscal authorities still minimise social ‘cost-to-
go’.
In the third scenario, the monetary authorities minimise the social loss
function while the ﬁscal authorities also use the same function (they support
monetary policy) but, additionally, they are penalised for excessive volatility
of the primary deﬁcit/surplus. Such constraint models restrictions similar
to those imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact.
In the fourth scenario the ﬁscal authorities minimise the social loss func-
tion, and the monetary authorities do the same, but they are also required
to change interest rate smoothly — there is a penalty on change in the in-
terest rate. A sluggishness of interest rate adjustment can be motivated by
the requirement of ﬁnancial stability.
We vary these penalties (or conservatism parameter) to see robustness
of the results. Table 1 presents the results of welfare loss evaluation. We
keep realistic calibration of the Phillips curve with inﬂation persistence5.
5We calibrate the parameters as β =0 .99, σ =0 .5,   =5 , ψ =2 , θ =0 .6 and γ =0 .75.
The standard deviation of all shocks is 0.5%.
65.1 Benevolent Policymakers
As well as Dixit and Lambertini (2003) we obtain that the leadership does
not matter for the two benevolent policymakers, see Table 1, the second
column. In a dynamic setup all components of the loss are also identical
for both leadership regimes. We also include column with non-strategic
behaviour by the ﬁscal authorities where their role is to keep government
expenditure constant, so monetary policy is left to stabilise shock alone6.A
comparison of the two columns reveals that if ﬁscal policy is allowed to be
stabilising, and even in a non-cooperative setup, both monetary and ﬁscal
policy together can do better than the monetary policy can do alone.
It is useful to note that with our preferred calibration of the model, the
optimal solution for a monetary and ﬁscal policy can be presented as follows.
For the monetary leadership
iL
t =1 2 .23εt +2 .00ηt +4 .05πt−1 +0 .80xt−1
gL
t =0 .03εt − 0.94ηt +0 .41πt−1 − 0.02xt−1 +0 .47iL
t
and for the ﬁscal leadership
gF
t =5 .76εt +0 .00ηt +2 .31πt−1 +0 .35xt−1
iF
t =6 .33εt +2 .00ηt +1 .69πt−1 +0 .44xt−1 +1 .02gF
t .
It is seen that in both cases the leadership coeﬃcient is positive, so con-
tractionary monetary policy goes along with an expantionary ﬁscal policy.
5.2 Conservative Central Banker
We then increase conservatism of the monetary authorities. The ﬁscal au-
thorities are minimising ‘cost-to-go’ with social one-period loss function,
and the monetary authorities do the same, except their weight on output
stabilisation (all λ− coeﬃcients) are multiplied by a common multiplier ρc
which is decreasing from one (benevolent monetary authorities) to almost
0.5 (conservative monetary authorities), see notes to Table 1. We rank the
outcomes using social metric (7). We ﬁnd that
(i) a slight conservatism of monetary authorities delivers better stochas-
tic equilibrium than the two benevolent policymakers,
(ii) only with higher conservatism of the monetary authorities, the ﬁscal
leadership is preferable to the monetary one, and
(iii) if the conservatism is large enough, then both leadership regimes are
worse than the benevolent regime.
6Automatic stabilisers still operate via taxation.
7To understand these results it might be helpful to look at impulse re-
sponses to supply shocks7 in Figure 1. The benchmark solid line denotes
responses under benevolent authorities, they are identical for the two lead-
ership regimes. With an increase in the central bank conservatism, the
monetary authorities concentrate more on inﬂation stabilisation, and are
prepared to pay for this with higher output variability. If the monetary
authorities are a leader, they are able to manipulate the ﬁscal authorities
to help them to reach their conservative target. This requires an aggressive
reaction of the interest rate (with a consequent consumption volatility) and
it results in higher variability of a ﬁscal instrument too. The higher output
variability (and all its components: terms of (5) with λ− coeﬃcients) has
smaller eﬀect on the monetary autorities’ loss due to the reduced weight
of it. However, with increased conservatism the output costs soon become
substantial component in the social costs, so the regime stops being su-
perior to all other regimes. When the ﬁscal authorities lead, they try to
manipulate monetary authorities to use their instrument to aﬀect demand
to help them to minimise their costs. However, the ﬁscal authorities are
more concerned with variability of the ﬁscal instrument, so they are less
able to manipulate the monetary authorities, as their instrument becomes
less volatile. So the monetary authorities are still successful in being tough
on inﬂation. This still improves the stochastic equilibrium. Because the
biggest relative penalty in the loss function is on inﬂation variability, this
determines the superiority of conservative regimes relative to the benevolent
regime. This eﬀect is eliminated when it is paid for with high variability of
the ﬁscal expenditures.
The analysis of these interactions might suggest that a constrained pol-
icymaker performs worse when being a leader, as it is not only constrained
in optimisation, but also in manipulation of the follower, see formulae (11)
and (12). If the follower is penalised, the leader could still be ﬂexible enough
to (partly) compensate for such constraint. However, the state of being con-
strained is diﬃcult to deﬁne. In what follows we take examples with addi-
tional quadratic terms (with positive weights) in the loss function of one of
the policymakers. This determines constraint and we might expect that this
should increase social loss of a resulting stochastic equilibrium8.W e n e x t
look at two examples.
7Due to entirely forward-looking structure of the Euler consumption equation, demand
shocks are immediately suppressed with interest rate reaction, this reaction is identical
for all leadership regimes and does not contribute to the diﬀerence in losses.
8This is not necessarily a general case, as the stochastic metric does not assume dis-
counting, for example.
85.3 Stability and Growth Pact
There is much discussion in the literature of how restrictive is the Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP) for the member countries of the European Monetary
Union. By imposing penalty for excessive public deﬁcit, the Pact reduces
the stabilisation ability of the ﬁscal policy and reduces union-wide welfare9.
Here we look at the leadership issue in a single country. It is a common
view that in a single country the ﬁscal authorities are the leader, although
it is also common that the ﬁscal authorities are not supposed to support
the stabilisation eﬀorts of the monetary authorities — the priority is given
to stabilisation of the domestic debt. In the monetary union the question
about whether it is desirable to allow for stabilisation function of the ﬁscal
authorities is not solved yet. Additionally, there is no consensus on the
resulting information structure and how the ﬁscal policy should be organised:
it is only clear that the current situation can be improved but rules vs.
institution question is still open. We look here whether the leadership issue
might be important if we want to design an institutional structure.
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 1 suggest that under the SGP, the regime
of ﬁscal leadership is not only worse than the regime of monetary leadership,
but it is also often worse than the regime with non-strategic ﬁscal behav-
iour with automatic stabilisers (compare columns (3) and (5)). Figure 2
illustrates that under the ﬁscal leadership, when the ﬁscal authorities try
to manipulate monetary authorities, inﬂation is less controlled. Apparently,
this is enough to ensure inferiority of the ﬁscal leadership, as inﬂation vari-
ability constitutes the main component of the social loss. This component
can also be big enough so that the ﬁscal leadership becomes worse than the
regime with automatic stabilisers. This example supports the conjecture
that a non-constrained leader performs better. However, in this case, we
imposed a constraint on a policymaker whose participation in a stabilisa-
tion game improves welfare only marginally. In the next example we look
at a constrained monetary authorities.
5.4 Financial Stability
We now require the monetary authorities would change interest rate smoothly,
in order to protect ﬁnancial stability. In this case the monetary policy is
not able to oﬀset the demand shocks completely, so the costs will be higher
than under benevolent authorities simply because of the extra losses due to
demand shocks. As demand shocks cannot be eliminated by means of mon-
etary policy, the ﬁscal policy has to intervene thus raising costs of change
in its instrument. This cost is higher under monetary leadership regime as
monetary authorities still try to manipulate ﬁscal authorities inducing ex-
tra volatility. For supply shocks, when monetary policy is unable to react
9See Kirsanova et al. (2003)
9aggressively, the ﬁscal policy has to compensate for this lack of interest rate
adjustment, so it becomes contractionary. The solution for monetary leader-
ship looks like (past interest rate becomes another predetermined variable):
iL
t =0 .71εt +0 .04ηt +0 .41πt−1 +0 .03xt−1 +0 .70it−1
gL
t = −5.28εt − 1.23ηt − 3.00πt−1 − 0.27xt−1 +0 .00it−1 +2 .39iL
t
Apparently, this may not be enough to eliminate shocks eﬃciently. Un-
der the ﬁscal leadership, it economises on the volatility of the ﬁscal instru-
ment and delivers slightly higher volatility of inﬂation, but lower volatility
of output. Fiscal policy is also unsuccessful in eﬃcient manipulation of the
monetary policy so it is contractionary as well:
gF
t = −2.28εt − 1.04ηt − 1.26πt−1 − 0.12xt−1 +1 .30iF
t−1
iF
t =0 .88εt +0 .10ηt +0 .52πt−1 +0 .04xt−1 +0 .062iF
t−1 +0 .05gF
t .
Although there is higher volatility of output due do demand shocks, the
relative weight of demand shocks in the welfare function is relatively small.
Thus both leadership regimes lead to increase of volatility of inﬂation. Our
numerical experiment shows that the ﬁscal leadership dominates, see also
Figures 3 and 4
To summarise, under our calibration of the model, when monetary policy
is constrained, then ﬁscal leadership delivers better results then monetary
leadership and, additionally, the participation of ﬁscal policy in the stabili-
sation process under both leadership regimes improves welfare.
5.5 Robustness of Results
In the analysis above we assumed a particular form of the Phillips curve with
substantial persistence, which we ﬁnd realistic. Therefore, our conclusions
are built on the analysis of transmission of supply shocks. How results
of our analysis depend on the degree of inﬂation persistence? In Table 2,
we evaluate the welfare loss as a function of ω, which is a proportion of
backward-looking individuals in the economy. When ω → 1 the population
becomes more and more backward-looking, χ → 1.
When the monetary authorities are slightly conservative, ρc =0 .9, the
ﬁscal leadership is inferior to the monetary leadership everywhere except
for very backward looking and the very forward-looking speciﬁcations. For
the very backward-looking population, the level of inﬂation is very much
determined by its past values, rather than by the impact of a policy. So
there is less diﬀerence in inﬂation variability under the two diﬀerent regimes
and lower variability of the ﬁscal instrument ensures superiority of the ﬁscal
leadership. Similarly, for the very forward-looking consumers, the shocks are
quickly eliminated from the system so the implied volatility of output and
10all its components, including the ﬁscal instrument, is small. Here the ﬁscal
leadership becomes superior due to lower variability of ﬁscal expenditures,
see also Figure 5.
For the ‘Stability and Growth Pact’ scenario, the ﬁscal leadership is
dominated by a monetary leadership for any degree of persistence.
The last case with constrained monetary authorities is diﬀerent. For our
preferred calibration with ρi =0 .5 we have that superiority of monetary
leadership is changing several times with increase in persistence. For the
very backward-looking population the diﬀerence in variability of inﬂation
and output falls, so the role of variability of the ﬁscal instrument seem to
determine overall superiority of the ﬁscal leadership, despite that monetary
policy is constrained. For suﬃciently forward-looking population, however,
we have a mixture of eﬀects and apriori it is not clear which dominates.
Figure 6 plots the diﬀerence between cost components of ﬁscal leadership
regime and monetary policy regime, a weight multiplied by the diﬀerence in
variances. With diminishing χ, the diﬀerence between inﬂation, output costs
all fall to zero. This should ensure the priority of the ﬁscal leadership as the
one with lower instrument variability. However, for the very forward-looking
consumers, the ﬁscal instrument is more volatile for the ﬁscal leadership,
than for the monetary leadership, namely this creates inferiority of the ﬁscal
leadership for the very small χ.
11Table 1: Welfare Losses for diﬀerent penalty
Conservative CB SGP Financial Stability
M( Wc
t )M ( Wt)M ( Wt + ρi(∆it)2)
F( Wt)F ( G) F( Wt + ρdd2
t)F ( Wt)F ( G)
M LF Ln / sM LF LM LF Ln / s
w (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0 1.4748 1.4748 1.5490 1.4748 1.4748 1.4748 1.4748 1.5490
1 1.4721 1.4726 1.5465 1.4762 1.4867 1.601 1.596 1.660
2 1.4701 1.4709 1.5446 1.4821 1.5014 1.652 1.647 1.719
3 1.4690 1.4698 1.5434 1.4905 1.5159 1.687 1.682 1.762
4 1.4691 1.4696 1.5430 1.4998 1.5292 1.714 1.709 1.798
5 1.4708 1.4703 1.5437 1.5094 1.5411 1.736 1.731 1.829
6 1.4744 1.4722 1.5456 1.5188 1.5517 1.754 1.750 1.856
7 1.4804 1.4756 1.5491 1.5279 1.5612 1.771 1.767 1.882
8 1.4897 1.4807 1.5543 1.5364 1.5695 1.786 1.782 1.905
9 1.5030 1.4880 1.5618 1.5444 1.5770 1.799 1.796 1.926
Notes: ML — Monetary leadership; FL — Fiscal leadership; n/s —
non-strategic;
ρi = w/10;ρd = w/100;ρc =1− w/2;
ω =0 .5, χ =0 .7.
Table 2: Table Caption
Benevolent Conservative CB SGP Financial Stability
M(Wt)M ( Wt)M ( Wc
t )M ( Wt)M ( Wt + ρi(∆it)2)
F(G) F(Wt)F ( G) F(Wt)F ( Wt + ρdd2
t)F ( Wt)F ( G)
χ n / s M L & F L n / sM LF LM LF LM LF Ln / s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
0.0 0.226∗ 0.207∗ 0.226∗ 0.207∗ 0.207∗ 0.211∗ 0.215∗ 0.220∗ 0.220∗ 0.230∗
0.1 0.310∗ 0.280∗ 0.311∗ 0.281∗ 0.281∗ 0.287∗ 0.294∗ 0.304∗ 0.304∗ 0.316∗
0.2 0.418∗ 0.373∗ 0.417∗ 0.372 0.372 0.383∗ 0.395∗ 0.417∗ 0.417∗ 0.432∗
0.3 0.573 0.506 0.571 0.504 0.504 0.523 0.541 0.598∗ 0.597∗ 0.617∗
0.4 0.745 0.657 0.740 0.654 0.655 0.681 0.707 0.820∗ 0.820∗ 0.853∗
0.5 0.975 0.875 0.969 0.869 0.871 0.907 0.939 1.122∗ 1.123∗ 1.190∗
0.6 1.227 1.132 1.221 1.126 1.127 1.168 1.203 1.412 1.410 1.507
0.7 1.549 1.475 1.545 1.470 1.471 1.509 1.541 1.736 1.731 1.829
0.8 2.020 1.976 2.017 1.973 1.974 2.002 2.027 2.186 2.180 2.257
0.9 3.086 3.067 3.084 3.067 3.066 3.079 3.095 3.207 3.202 3.254
Notes:
ML —Monetary leadership; FL — Fiscal leadership; n/s — non-strategic;
ρd =0 .05; ρi =0 .5;ρc =0 .9;

































































Figure 1: Supply shock for the ‘conservative central bank’ scenario. Solid
line denotes responses under the benevolent authorities, the dashed line
denotes responses under slightly conservative central bank, and the dotted

































































Figure 2: Supply shock for the ‘Stability and Growth Pact’ scenario. Solid
line denotes responses under the benevolent authorities, the dashed line
denotes responses under small penalty on ﬁscal deﬁcit, and the dotted line

































































Figure 3: Supply shock for the ‘Financial Stability’ scenario. Solid line
denotes responses under the benevolent authorities, the dashed line denotes
responses under small penalty on change in interest rate, and the dotted line





































































Figure 4: Demand shock for the ‘Financial Stability’ scenario. Solid line
denotes responses under the benevolent authorities, the dashed line denotes
responses under small penalty on change in interest rate, and the dotted line





























































Figure 5: Supply shocks for ‘conservative central bank’ scenario. The solid
line presents no persistence case, the dashed line presents increased persis-
tence and the dotted line shows case with high persistence.



























































































Figure 6: Diﬀerence in costs components between ﬁscal leadership regime
and monetary leadership regume.
18A Leadership equilibria under discretion
What role is there for leadership under discretion? This question was posed
(and answered) by Cohen and Michel (1988). They made a distinction be-
tween the ability to lead within the periodicity of the model and over all
time. In their model, a continuous time one, the periodicity of the model
is inﬁnitesimal. There is still a gain from leadership.10 Acting as a Stack-
elberg leader for all time is akin to being able to adopt a time-inconsistent
commitment strategy (see the discussion in Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p.
74—77). We eschew this, but indicate how a leadership role can still be mod-
elled.11 In this section we discuss the forms of model we are interested in
and set up some useful relationships before discussing the policy equilibria.
We pay careful attention to the key relationships that we use in deriving our
leadership equilibria.
A.1 A class of models
We need to set up an analytical framework. We assume a nonsingular linear
stochastic rational expectations model of the type described by Blanchard
and Kahn (1980) augmented by a vector of control instruments. Speciﬁcally,





























where Yt is an n1-vector of predetermined variables with initial conditions
Y0 given, Xt is n2-vector of non-predetermined (or jump) variables, UF
t and
UL
t are two vectors of policy instruments of two policymakers, F and L,o f
size kF and kL respectively, and εt+1 is vector of innovations to predeter-
mined variables with covariance matrix Σ.S o m eo fe l e m e n t si nYt could be
exogenous variables, like the level of domestic debt. For notational conve-
nience we deﬁne the n-vector Zt =( Y 0
t,X0
t)0 where n = n1+n2 and a vector
of control variables Ut =( UL0
t ,UF0
t )0.
Typically, this system represents the solved out optimisation problem for
the ultimate follower in the policy game. This player also has ‘instruments’,
represented by Xt. Rational agents when solving their optimisation problem
treat the instruments of other players parametrically. Additionally, there
is an equation explaining evolution of predetermined variable Y ,s ot h e s e
two equations together describe the ‘evolution of the economy’ (13). In a
canonical representation of such a system the ﬁrst equation explains the
evolution of Y and the second equation describes the reaction function X.
In what follows, we will treat the second equation in this system as to an one
10Of course, in the original formulation of static policy games, this form of commitment
is all (Barro and Gordon, 1983).
11For completeness we discuss the implications for solution in Section A.6.
19explaining the behaviour of the third player. One can draw the analogy with
the behaviour of the private sector in macroeconomic models, presented by
the Euler consumption equation and the Phillips curve, see Section 2 below.

























































s are the goal variables of policymakers F and L
correspondingly, G
j
s = C e Z0












and the matrices KF and KL are symmetric (without loss of generality) and
contain weights on each goal. The loss function of each player can include




In a linear-quadratic setup the optimal solution of a time-consistent feedback
policy is necessarily a linear rule. Therefore, when imposing this functional
form we do not narrow the class of possible solutions. We now derive several
useful relationships between parameters of our model.
In a leadership equilibrium, the follower treats the leader’s policy instru-






Therefore, the follower’s reaction function will necessarily be a rule of the
following form:
UF
t = −FFYt − LUL
t (17)
and the leader’s reaction will be:
UL
t = −FLYt. (18)







A11 − B12(FF − LFL) − B11FL A12












Therefore, using either Blanchard and Kahn (1980) formula or a generalised
Schur decomposition (see, e.g., Söderlind, 1999) it is easy to ﬁnd the current
value of jump variables (or the reaction of the third player):
Xt = −NYt. (20)
We can bring this representation into an equivalent form in terms of prede-
termined variables and controls (as did Oudiz and Sachs, 1985).
This implies that the following relationships always hold:
Xt+1 = −NYt+1 = −N(A11Yt + A12Xt + B1UF
t + B11UL
t ) (21)
= A21Yt + A22Xt + B2UF
t + B21UL
t
from where we can obtain:
Xt = −(A22 + NA12)−1[(A21 + NA11)Yt
+( B22 + NB1)UF
t +( B21 + NB11)UL
t ]
= −JYt − KFUF
t − KLUL
t . (22)
In the last formula:
J =( A22 + NA12)−1(A21 + NA11) (23)
KF =( A22 + NA12)−1(B22 + NB12) (24)
KL =( A22 + NA12)−1(B21 + NB11) (25)
therefore the matrix N can also be determined from:
N = J − KF(FF − LFL) − KLFL. (26)
This is an important implication of the system under control. N obtained
from (20) should coincide with that from (26).
So far we have discussed properties of policy equilibria without discussing
the optimisation problems explicitly. We note that the treatment of rational
agents is that they have essentially solved an optimisation problem already
treating the behaviour of all other decision makers as parametric. However
we are able to describe their reactions to potential changes in policies by
those agents using (22).
21A.3 Method of Lagrange Multipliers
We begin by solving the relevant optimisation problems using the method
of Lagrange multipliers.
A.3.1 Follower’s optimisation problem
The follower is maximising its objective function with respect to UF
t ,t a k i n g
Xt as given, but recognising dependence of Xt on UF
t .T h ei n s t r u m e n to ft h e
leader, UL
t is given too and treated parametrically. We deﬁne a constrained
















s+1(A11Ys + A12Xs + B1Us − Ys+1)
with λs+1 is a vector of (non-predetermined) Lagrange multipliers. The







































































s correspondingly. However, the non-predetermined variable Xt is
chosen given the information about the behaviour of the policymakers (26)












22This system must be solved for UF
t = −FFYt − LUL
t as function of state
variables Yt and UL
t . Then it will be substituted back into the evolution
of the system and the leader will chose its instrument optimally. We now
demonstrate how it can be done.




























0=A11Ys + A12Xs + B11UL
s + B12UF
s − Ys+1 =0 (32)
here we used µs = βs−tλs. We now substitute Xt = −JYt−KFUF
t −KLUL
t
into system (30)—(32). Then it will have three variables, predetermined Yt
and non-predetermined µt and UF



































where e UF =( UF0,µ 0)0. This system is similar to (13) but with singular
matrix ΦF,b e c a u s eΦF
22 contains columns of zeros. Now we repeat the same
procedure as we did in equations (13)—(22). We assume that UL
t = −FLYt,


























As before, this equation can now be solved using the generalised Schur de-
composition, which leads to the following ralationships:
Yt+1 = MYt (35)
e Ut = −SYt (36)































and if matrix ΦF
22SΨF
12 + ΨF
22 is invertible, we get a decomposition of the


















23Therefore, from the ﬁnal formula (38) we have UF
t = −FFYt−LUL
t and this
reaction function should be substituted in the optimisation problem for the
l e a d e r .N o t et h a tm a t r i c e sKF, KL and J in system (30)—(32) are unknown.
They must be found from the iterative procedure which we will discuss later
in the text.
A.3.2 Leader’s optimisation problem
Leader takes into account the follower’s reaction function. Thus, we deﬁne












s+1((A11 − B12FF)Ys + A12Xs +( B11 − B12L)UL
s − Ys+1)
with κs+1 is a vector of (non-predetermined) Lagrange multipliers. Since
the feedback rule (17) is essentially static relationship, we substitute it into
objective function (15) in order to obtain matrices with tilda . Namely,
matrix (16) can be found as:
e KL = C0KLC
where matrix C translates the vector of all variables into the vector of vari-































The feedback rule is also substituted into constraint.
Thus, our problem has collapsed to the standard problem of ﬁnding
discretionary equilibrium, see e.g., Söderlind (1999).




































= βs−t( e RLUL
s + e PL0
1 Ys + e PL0





12κs+1 + βs−t( e QL
21Ys + e QL






= βs−t( e QL
11Ys + e QL
12Xs + e PL
1 UL








= −(KL − KFL)0,
∂Xs
∂Ys
= −(J − KFFF)0
We substitute these matrices into system (39)—(41) and obtain the following
system:
0=(e RL − (KL − KFL)0 e PL
2 )UL
s +(e PL0
1 − (KL − KFL)0 e QL
21)Ys (42)
+(e PL0
2 − (KL − KFL)0 e QL
22)Xs + β((B11 − B12L)0 − (KL − KFL)0A0
12)νs+1
0=(e QL
11 − (J − KFFF)0 e QL
21)Ys +(e QL
12 − (J − KFFF)0 e QL
22)Xs (43)
+(e PL
1 − (J − KFFF)0 e PL
2 )UL
s + β((A11 − B12FF)0 − (J − KFFF)0A0
12)νs+1 − νs
0=( A11 − B12FF)Ys + A12Xs +( B11 − B12L)UL
s − Ys+1 (44)
w h e r ew eu s e dn o t a t i o nνs = βs−tκs. Additionally, we have the feedback
rule:
Xs = −JYs − KFUF
s − KLUL
s = −(J − KFFF)Ys − (KL − KFL)UL
s
that should be substituted into equations (42)—(44) which can be written in
























where e UL =( UL0,ν0)0, and solved, using Schur decomposition, as:












Equation (47) gives the optimal feedback rule UL
t = −FLYt.
A.3.3 Iterative Procedure
We start with initial approximation for policy rules, with FF
(0), FL
(0) and L(0)
and solve the follower’s problem, using formulae (36), (38) in turn. We will
25improve FF
(1) and L(1) but not FL
(0). We then update matrices in equations
(23)-(25) and solve the leader’s problem. This will give us new best reaction
FL
(1). Then we again solve the problem for the follower to update FF
(2) and
L(2) and so on.
A.4 Dynamic Programming Approach
We turn to an alternative characterisation using dynamic programming.
A.4.1 The Follower’s Optimisation Problem
As discussed above, both policymakers implement policy using feedback
rules. The leader feeds back on the predetermined state knowing the fol-
lower’s reaction, UL
t = −FLYt. The follower observes the leader’s action
and treats it parametrically, UF
t = −FFYt − LUL
t = −(FF − LFL)Yt.
















We can substitute this into (48) and using the fact that Xt = −JYt −
KFUF
t − KLUL
t and Yt+1 =( A11 − A12J)Yt +( B1 − A12KF)UF



















































































Now, we can substitute the reaction rules (17) and (18) in (50) to obtain
recursive equations for St:
St = T0 + βT0St+1T (51)
where:






FLF L + FL0L0Us0
F
− FL0L0P0
sFL − FL0PsLFL − FF0RsLFL − FL0L0RsFF
+ FF0P0
sFL + FL0PsFF
T =( A11 − A12J) − (B12 − A12KF)FF
+( ( B12 − A12KF)L − (B11 − A12KL))FL
while the feedback rule can be determined from (50) by diﬀerentiating the
loss function with respect to UF
t :
UF














= −FFYt − LUL
t
from where:







L =( Rs + β(B0
12 − KF0A0




These two formulae give an update on FF and L.
These three formulae (51), (52) and (53) are an analogue of the Oudiz
and Sachs (1985) recursive procedure which can be easily programmed.
27A.4.2 The Leader’s Optimisation Problem
This part of optimisation is the standard Oudiz and Sachs (1985) procedure








A11 − B12FF A12




















and the loss function is determined by:
e KL = C0KLC
where matrix C translates the vector of all variables into the vector of vari-































and e KL is partitioned conformally with (Y 0
t,X0
t,UL0
t )0. This problem can
be solved using the dynamic programming procedure explained in detail in
Söderlind (1999).
A.4.3 Iterative Procedure
W es t a r tw i t ha ni n i t i a lg u e s so fFF
(0), FL
(0) and L(0) and solve the optimisation
problem for the follower. We also need initial approximation for N(0) and
S(0). The iteration involves computing reaction function N(1) and the value
function S(1). This improves FF
(1) and L(1) but not, of course, FL
(0).W e
then compute new matrices using (54) and solve the problem for the leader
that takes into account the reaction of the follower and the evolution of the
economy. This will give us new best reaction FL
(1). Then we again solve the
problem for the follower to update FF
(2) and L(2) and so on.
A.5 Lagrange Multipliers vs. Dynamic Programming
This iterative procedure which uses Lagrange multipliers involves ﬁnding
N and FF, FL,L using (36), (38) and (47). Diﬀerent from the dynamic
programming algorithm, the value function S is not computed. As this al-
gorithm involves eigenvalue decomposition such as Schur decomposition, it
is important that all approximations of policy rules deliver the saddle-path
stability of the system, otherwise there is a wrong number of stable and
unstable roots and the algorithm will stop. Clearly, it is not always possible
28to ensure. However, in our experiments the Lagrange multipliers algorithm
was converging faster than the dynamic programming algorithm in terms
of computational time. In fact, in many cases, the dynamic programming
algorithm also requires a reasonable starting values for N and S.W h i l e
S can be computed iteratively when solving Riccati equation, N still has
to be obtained using matrix inversion as in Blanchard and Kahn (1980),
using initial approximations to FF, FL and L. Therefore, the same problem
of ﬁnding a good prior which ensures saddle-path stability also remains for
the dynamic programming approach. There is an advantage of Lagrange
multipliers approach in that it conveys the underlying information struc-
ture, and allows us to interpret discretionary the equilibrium as a feedback
Stackelberg one, with a very clear treatment of the third player as the ulti-
mate follower. For most complicated problems these two approaches should
probably be used together, especially in order to check that both of them
converge to the same equilibrium. We have seen that for some problems the
dynamic programming algorithm was converging to the wrong point (not
welfare maximising). The Lagrange multipliers approach was necessary to
check the solution.
A.6 Discretion, Commitment and Leadership
Dixit and Lambertini (2003) discuss two leadership equilibria when one of
the players can precommit and the other acts under discretion. They ﬁnd
that the solution is exactly the same as when both players act with discre-
tion. However, they consider a static game. In the dynamic game which we
consider, the equivalent equilibria cannot be calculated.
Indeed, suppose the leader can precommit for all periods. In our setup
this mean that the optimal policy for the leader will be to feed back on the
predetermined state Yt and the state of predetermined Lagrange multipliers,
say Λt. The follower observes the leader’s decisions and should react with
UF
t = −FFYt−LUL











˜ A11 (B12LF Λ − B11FΛ) A12
S1 S2 0

















where ˜ A11 = A11 − B12(FF − LFM) − B11FM and ˜ A21 = A21 − B22(FF −
LFM)−B21FM and the second line explains evolution of the predetermined
Lagrange multipliers. Immediately from here it is clear that if one of the
followers acts in a time-consistent way it should feed back on both sets of
predetermined variables, Xt = −N1Yt − N2Λt or UF
t = −FFYt − LUL
t =
−(FF − LF L)Yt + LFΛΛt. The welfare function (49) should depend on
(Y 0
t,Λ0
t)0. Thus, any followers necessarily also react to Λt as this reﬂects the
leader’s behaviour.
29The importance of this is illustrated by what could sometimes described
as the diﬀerence between a levels bias and so-called stabilisation bias. In
the static game set up (for example the two ‘player’ Barro and Gordon
(1983) one) the resulting equilibrium manifests a suboptimal level solution
(in that case an inﬂationary bias) whereas in dynamic games there is a
diﬀerent source of suboptimality, such that disturbances are rejected less
well than under the optimal plan, the stabilisation bias. But the optimal
plan is also time inconsistent and so would usually be ruled out. However,
it is completely diﬀerent to the Dixit and Lambertini (2003) example. The
ability to precommit in our example would generate a completely diﬀerent
optimisation problem, and the resulting equilibrium would not coincide with
the ‘all players act with discretion’ case.
B Model Parameters
The Phillips curve can be derived as :




γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ)
,κ x0 =
(1 − ω)(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)
(γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ))(ψ +  )
,
κx1 =
ω(1 + γβ)(1 − γ)
γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ)
δ, κc =
(1 − ω)(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)ψ
(γ(1 − ω)+ω(1 + γβ))(ψ +  )σ
where γ is probability that wage contract is not renewed, ω is proportion of
rule-of thumb price-setters (Steinsson (2003)) and δ is coeﬃcient on demand
pressure in price-setting rule for the rule of thumb price-setters. Coeﬃcients
σ and ψ are parameters of utility terms u(Cs,ξ s) and v(hs(z),ξ s) corre-
spondingly (see Steinsson (2003), the notation is standard).
The one-period social loss function can be derived as:
Wt =
ψ(1 − γβ)(1 − γ)





























where 1 − θ is the size of the government sector in the economy, G/Y .
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